

### Are the Balkans Different? Mapping Protest Politics in Post-Communist Southeast Europe

Tatar, Marius Ioan

Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version  
Konferenzbeitrag / conference paper

#### Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:

Tatar, M. I. (2013). Are the Balkans Different? Mapping Protest Politics in Post-Communist Southeast Europe. In F. Bieber, & D. Brentin (Eds.), *Social Movements in the Balkans: Rebellion and Protest from Maribor to Taksim* (pp. 1-31) Universität Graz, Zentrum für Südosteuropastudien. <https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-59039-8>

#### Nutzungsbedingungen:

Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz (Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden Sie hier:  
<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/1.0/deed.de>

#### Terms of use:

This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence (Attribution-Non Commercial-NoDerivatives). For more information see:  
<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/1.0>

# Are the Balkans Different? Mapping Protest Politics in Post-Communist Southeast Europe

**Marius I. TATAR**  
University of Oradea

**Abstract:** This chapter examines the dynamics and determinants of different forms of protest activities in Southeast Europe. The author follows a longitudinal approach using statistical analysis of survey datasets, thereby capturing the dynamism of the phenomena allowing for both a single-country analysis and cross-national comparison. The contribution aims to profile different types of protesters and their elite-challenging protest action repertoire, as well as factors that may account for their preference for certain forms of protest actions over others. The chapter ultimately illustrates the implications for our understanding of how protest action repertoires are reconfigured in post-communist societies and their consequences for democratic governance in the region.

**Keywords:** *protest politics, Southeast Europe, post-communism, Balkans, democratic governance*

**This is preliminary version of a book chapter. Please cite as:**

Tătar, Marius Ioan (2018) “Are the Balkans Different? Mapping Protest Politics in Post-Communist Southeast Europe” in Florian Bieber, Dario Brentin (eds.) *Social Movements in the Balkans: Rebellion and Protest from Maribor to Taksim*, London, Routledge, e-ISBN 9781351684620, pp. 131-157.

# **Are the Balkans Different? Mapping Protest Politics in Post-Communist Southeast Europe**

**Dr. Marius I. TATAR**  
PhD Lecturer in Political Science  
University of Oradea  
mtatar@uoradea.ro

Transitions to democracy and EU integration processes in post-communist Europe were accompanied by relatively low levels of protest mobilization. However, in recent years new waves of protests have emerged in the region, ranging from mass demonstrations to organized strikes and riots. The spread of elite-challenging activities suggests a revival of protest politics in former communist countries during the current economic crisis. This chapter comparatively examines the dynamics and determinants of different forms of protest activities in Southeast Europe<sup>1</sup> (SEE). Drawing on theoretical insights derived from the political behavior and social movements literatures this chapter analyzes the profile of different types of protesters and also the factors that can account for their preference for certain forms of protest actions versus others. Research on SEE often investigates citizen participation from a cross-national perspective at one point in time, especially emphasizing aspects of electoral participation. This study follows a longitudinal approach that captures the dynamic phenomena of protest participation using statistical analysis of survey datasets (such as the successive waves of European Values Surveys and World Values Surveys) which allow cross-national and within country comparisons over time. Besides assessing the effects of individual-level variables, the paper also considers country-level contextual factors such as the levels of democratic and economic development.

The countries I am focusing on in this chapter are new democracies. During their transition from communism, some of these societies experienced relatively long periods of political instability, economic distress<sup>2</sup>, interethnic and inter-confessional tensions and even armed conflicts. Thus, the question that arises is whether protest politics strengthens or

---

<sup>1</sup> The states included in this analysis offer a significant cross-country variation in terms of protest patterns: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia and Slovenia.

<sup>2</sup> A notable example in this sense is the Albanian economic crisis of 1997 that was accompanied by unprecedented institutional, political and social turmoil leading to a spiral of violence and chaos (Vaughan-Whitehead 1999).

weakens the prospects of democratic consolidation in this region? In other words, who is more prone to protest: those having authoritarian orientations or those who share a democratic political culture? If for instance, citizens oriented toward authoritarianism are more likely to be politically engaged in this region, then the processes of democratic consolidation might be threatened. A massive involvement of authoritarian minded citizens in the political process might provide a good ground for the emergence of populist authoritarianism in these countries (Krajnc, Flere, and Kirbiš 2012). If on the other hand, citizens who participate in protests are on average more democratically oriented, sometimes called *critical democrats* (Dalton and Welzel 2014), then they can challenge political elites, demanding more open, accountable and responsive democratic governance. In this case, protesters may have the potential to play a pivotal role in the democratic consolidation process in post-communist countries (Guérin, Petry, and Crête 2004).

The rest of this paper is structured into five main parts. First, I will conceptualize protest politics within the framework of democratic theories and then I will briefly review arguments derived from some of most influential theoretical perspectives aiming to explain protest participation. In the next section, I draw a general picture of the dynamics of protest politics in post-communist SEE before the economic crisis. Then I focus on the features of participants in two of the most common forms of protesting, that are signing petitions and demonstrating. Further on, the chapter explores the patterns of protest politics during the economic crisis by a comparative analysis of Romania and Slovenia. I conclude with a discussion of the main findings and their implications for our understanding on how protest action repertoires are reconfigured in post-communist societies and their consequences for democratic governance and stability in the region.

### **Conceptualizing and Explaining Protest Participation: Theoretical Perspectives**

Protest politics is understood as the deliberate use of protest actions by groups or organizations (and sometimes by individual citizens) in order to influence a political decision or process, which they perceive as having negative consequences for themselves, another group or society as a whole (Dalton 2013, 52-56). Political protest can refer to any political and social issue that is debated and contested, ranging from single issue protests to broad reformist or revolutionary plans to shape the society. Some groups use protest as a key mechanism to make their voice heard, while others use it to a much lesser extent or not at all (Rucht 2007, 708). In addition to the kinds of actors and aims, the

levels and forms of political protest vary extremely. Protest can take different forms, ranging from legal ones (legal strikes and demonstrations, petitions, complaints, etc.) to illegal and sometimes violent ones (illegal strikes, violent demonstrations, occupying buildings, blocking roads, etc.). The distinctions mentioned above are important both for studying the degree of protest participation but also for understanding the motivational dynamics underlying various forms of protests (Opp and Kittel 2010). In terms of participation degree, a significant part of the population might approve and even participate in actions that comply with the norms of the existing social system such as petitioning or taking part in a peaceful demonstration. On the other hand, usually only an extreme minority engages in actions that violate social rules such as violent protests, occupying buildings or public spaces and blocking roads (Tătar 2015, Guérin, Petry, and Crête 2004). Moreover, different motivational attitudes might explain participation in different forms of protest (Uslaner 2004).

The question as to why do people engage in political protests has generated a lot of interest among scholars coming from various disciplines such as political science, sociology, political economy, social psychology and history. Responses to this question are divided between macro and micro level approaches, which belong to different scholarly traditions (Norris, Walgrave, and Aelst 2006). Macro accounts derived mainly from historical sociology and comparative politics seek to explain the cycles of protest mobilization and processes of contentious politics as systemic phenomena. Among macro approaches, prominent are political process theories contending that in order to protest, aggrieved people not only need strategic resources, but also certain suitable political contexts (Tarrow 1998, McAdam 1982, McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996) that guarantee more open political opportunity structures (Tilly and Tarrow 2007). Compared to authoritarian regimes, democracies further collective action by relaxing repression, encouraging associational life, and opening channels of popular participation (Johnston and Almeida 2006). In this sense, democracies tend to lower the cost of protest participation, while in the same time increase its potential benefits. Alternatively, micro approaches focus on individual level behavior linking specific characteristics of social background, social networks and attitudinal orientations to one's propensity to engage in protest actions (Dalton 2013, van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013b, Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).

Initially, radical disaffection theories viewed protest politics as an irrational outburst of potentially discontented classes such as the poor, the youth and uneducated and

unemployed that threaten the public order (Rucht 2007, Norris, Walgrave, and Aelst 2006). However, subsequent studies have found little empirical evidence that the most politically alienated and deprived people are those who protest more (Dalton 2013). On the contrary, relative deprivation theories convincingly explained why the objectively most deprived people were not necessarily the ones that made their voice heard through protests (Rucht 2007). While the conclusion of relative deprivation theories is that at the heart of every protest are grievances (van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013b), not all aggrieved people protest. Only when additional factors come into play do grievances result into actual protest (Rucht 2007). Supporters of modernization theory (Inglehart 1997, 1990, 1977) suggest that protest politics will be used more often by middle class and university educated people holding post-materialist values (Dalton 2013), since these segments of the population have the resourced and cognitive skills required by this kind of elite-challenging activism. At country aggregate levels, previous research has pointed out that citizens tend to engage more both in conventional and protest forms of political activity in socioeconomically more developed countries (Blais 2007, Bernhagen and Marsh 2007, Norris 2002, Newton and Montero 2007).

Individual level explanations of political participation often focus on resources that facilitate political action and lay the groundwork for the civic voluntarism model (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). This model includes status variables such as: age, socioeconomic status, education, class and residence (Pattie and Johnston 1998). Education is one of the strongest predictors of participation because it provides cognitive and civic awareness which helps citizens better understand politics (Norris 2002). The main thesis of the socio-economic model is that people with higher economic status - higher education, higher incomes, and better occupational positions - are more active in politics. In addition to skills and other resources that can facilitate civic involvement, motivation is also necessary for individuals to become active in politics. Among the most prominent motivational attitudes and values mentioned in the literature as influencing activism are: political interest and support for the political system, confidence in the main political institutions of representative democracy such as the parliament, the government, or political parties (Quintelier and van Deth 2014, Schussman and Soule 2005). Beside instrumental motivations to protest, some people may protest based on ideological (leftist or rightist) or expressive considerations (Klandermans 2004). Persons expressing several values associated with a democratic culture such as lifestyle tolerance, tolerance towards immigrants and gender role egalitarianism (Kirbiš 2013, Guérin, Petry, and Crête 2004), or those having more inclusive views on

nationality and a cosmopolitan sense of belonging (Tarrow 2012) are expected to be more engaged in protest activities. Political socialization (Petrovic, Stekelenburg, and Klandermans 2014) and willingness to affect changes in society (Martin 2015) are also factors associated with more activism protest movements.

Most protest events are not spontaneous and solitary acts but organized collective actions (Fillieule 1997). Therefore, both the propensity to protest and the repertoire of protest actions is highly contingent on a person's belonging to various social networks and organizations that actually create the availability of collective action opportunities (van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013b). Moreover, the effect of embeddedness into social networks on the propensity to participate in politics depends on the amount of political discussion that occurs in social networks and the information that people are able to gather about politics as a result (McClurg 2003). Organizational approaches emphasize the mobilizing role of agents and social networks, including political parties, unions, religious organizations (churches) and voluntary associations in activating political engagement. Following Robert Putnam (2000, 1993) a plethora of studies emphasize the role of voluntary associations in fostering social and political participation (Alexander et al. 2012, Kriesi 2008, Deth 2006, Newton 2001, Levi 1996). According to Putnam's social capital theory, a wide range of heterogeneous organizations and social groups enable face to face meetings of members and contribute to the production of dense civic networks that strengthen community bonds and social trust. The literature on social capital and civil society highlights that proximity to an organization (political or not) has the effect of channeling individuals more or less directly into politics (Zakaria 2013, Wallace, Pichler, and Haerpfer 2012, Uhlin 2009, Lambright, Mischen, and Laramee 2009, Diani 2009). In most direct ways, a person who belongs to more groups has higher odds to be politically involved as s/he has higher chances to be recruited and invited to participate politically. Moreover, socially involved people are more likely to recognize the relevance of politics to their lives and eventually get involved in politics, simply because they contact, meet and converse with more people than socially isolated persons who are most often marginalized and politically alienated (Woshinsky 2008).

### **Trends of protest politics in South-Eastern Europe: a comparative perspective**

I use European Values Survey (EVS) and World Values Survey (WVS) datasets to measure citizens' involvement in elite-challenging activities. Respondents to these public opinion polls were asked whether they have actually done the following activities: signing a

petition, attending lawful demonstrations, joining in boycotts, joining unofficial strikes, and occupying buildings or factories (see Table 1). However, these five protest activities differ in the risk involved and the violence inherent to each act— and also in the extent to which an individual is prepared use these actions. In this sense, relatively innocuous behaviors, such as signing a petition or attending a peaceful demonstration are practiced by more people compared to increasingly severe forms of protest, such as occupations and riots. And this general pattern of what we might call *the civility of protest politics* holds in each of the five European regions, although Western European citizens are more active on all five items, including the more contentious ones.

**Table 1: Protest participation in Europe 2008. Regional variation in a comparative perspective**

	<b>Signing a petiti on</b>	<b>Attending lawful demonstrati ons</b>	<b>Joining in boycotts</b>	<b>Joining unofficial strikes</b>	<b>Occupyin g buildings or factories</b>	<b>Summari zed protest activity (at least 1)</b>
Post-communist SEE	23.7%	12.1%	8.6%	4.1%	1.8%	29.1%
Western Europe	52.0%	25.1%	12.5%	5.8%	2.9%	58.0%
Post-communist CEE	21.3%	7.8%	2.9%	1.5%	0.5%	25.2%
Former Soviet countries	10.2%	12.3%	5.6%	5.3%	1.9%	23.3%
Other	12.8%	11.3%	4.5%	1.6%	1.1%	18.3%


*Data source: EVS 2008.*

To aggregate protest participation into a variable more readily comparable across countries I constructed a summary measure of protest activism. The last column in Table 1 reports the percentages of respondents who said they have engaged in at least one of the five protest actions. I use this summary measure in Figure 1 to present the dynamics of protest politics in each of the ten South-Eastern European countries analyzed in this paper. There are divergent trends of protest politics in the two decades that preceded the economic crisis. In some countries such as Romania the numbers of protesters has dramatically decreased on all five forms of protest presented in Table 1 an also on the aggregate measure of protest participation. By contrast, in Macedonia there is a substantial increase of the share of protesters on all five items while in Slovenia significant increases are recorded particularly in terms of signing petitions and attending demonstrations (see Table 2). On the other hand, the aggregate share of protesters remained virtually the same in Croatia at almost 45% of the



adult population. However, it should be noted that petitioners, representing around 41% of the population both in 1996 and 2008, make up the bulk of protesters in Croatia (see Table 2). Nevertheless, the share of Croatians joining in boycotts increased from 4.3% to 9.1% and the proportion of those attending demonstrations grew from 6.5% to 8.4% from 1996 to 2008 but these figures do not weight considerably in the aggregate share of protesters as shown in Figure 1.

**Figure 1: Trends of protest participation in post-communist SEE, 1995-2008**




Data source: WVS 1995, EVS 2008

Beside divergent trends, Figure 1 also points out a high between-country variation in the share of protesters: from less than 15% in Romania and Bulgaria to almost 45% in Croatia and Kosovo and almost 40% in Macedonia and Slovenia. What factors can account for these significant differences? Two of the usual suspects are: first, the level of democratic development suggested by the political opportunity structure theory and second, the level of economic development suggested by modernization theory. Figure 2 points out that, contrary to expectations derived from political opportunity structure theory, there seems to be no significant relationship between the level of democracy and the levels of protest activity in these countries. In other words, countries that are more democratically developed and presumably provide the more opportunities for protest (increasing the benefits and lowering the costs of protests) are not necessarily the ones in which citizens protest more. For instance, at the onset of the economic crisis, EU member countries like Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria, which scored higher on democratic development as measured by the World Bank's

worldwide governance indicators<sup>3</sup> in 2008, had lower shares of protesters compared with Kosovo and Macedonia. These findings suggest that protest politics in the Balkans might be explained by other factors not accounted for by theories mainly developed based on empirical data collected in advanced democracies.

**Figure 2: Quality of democracy and protest activity in SEE Europe (2008)**




*Data Source:* EVS 2008; World Bank, WGI 2008, accessed 14.02.2014

However, when we include economic development into equation we note two divergent trends (see Figure 3). First, economic and democratic developments strongly correlate. Thus, higher levels of GDP/capita are associated with higher quality of democracy and this confirms expectations derived from modernization theories. Slovenia as well as Croatia particularly stand out from this point of view. Second, protest activity is very poorly related to economic development in post-communist Southeast Europe, contrary to what modernization theory would suggest. For instance, less developed states like Macedonia and Kosovo have much higher protest rates than more developed countries in the region. Previous studies have linked increased citizen participation in economically less developed post-

<sup>3</sup> The World Bank provides aggregate and individual governance indicators for 215 countries and territories over the period 1996–2012, for six dimensions of governance. Available online at: <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/worldwide-governance-indicators>, accessed 14.02.2014.

Yugoslav states to a growing politicization of these societies along deep-rooted cleavages (such as those based on ethnic and religious fragmentation) that have structured political conflict and competition (see Kirbiš 2013 for a synteshis on post-Yugoslav citizen participation). Nevertheless, our data suggest more complex patterns of relationships between various factors and protest participation in this region. For instance, a country marked by relatively low levels of ethnic and religious diversity such as Croatia also records higher levels of protest participation than its economic development would predict (see figure 3). As shown above, petitioners represent the biggest part of Croatian protesters (see Table 2) while in Kosovo and Macedonia beside petitioners, there are relatively high numbers of demonstrators and persons who join in boycotts.

**Figure 3: Economic development, quality of democracy and protest activity in SEE (2008)**



Data source: EVS 2008, World Bank WGI, 2008, accessed 14.02.2014.

Overall, country aggregated levels of economic development and quality of democracy do not offer satisfactory explanations for the variation of the share of protesters in this region. It seems that other factors come into play when explaining protest participation at

the country-aggregate level (Krajnc, Flere, and Kirbiš 2012). In the next sections, I will move from country aggregate to the individual level analysis that will highlight the features of protesters in each of the ten countries of post-communist SEE. This will be done by comparing the determinants of petitioning and demonstrating, two of the most commonly used forms of protest action.

### **Who Protests in SEE? Comparing Determinants of Petitioning and Demonstrating across Countries and Regions**

This section outlines the profile of protesters in post-communist South-Eastern Europe by comparing the individual determinants of signing petitions and participation in lawful demonstrations. While an increasing number studies investigate how internet is influencing political activism (Gibson and Cantijoch 2013, Cantijoch, Cutts, and Gibson 2015) particularly among the youth (Xenos, Vromen, and Loader 2014), many point out a digital divide that reinforces traditional socioeconomic inequalities in online participation (Oser, Hooghe, and Marien 2013). For instance, the spread of internet may have reduced the cost of signing petitions, but this does not necessarily increase the share of petitioners in all countries. In fact, as data in Table 2 show from 1998 to 2008, the proportion of those who signed a petition has decreased in 3 countries and increased in other 6 countries. This suggests that beside a simple cost-benefit rationale, there are also other relevant factors that influence signing petitions (see Table 3 in Appendix). The most spectacular increases in terms of shares of petitioners occurred in Macedonia from about 14% to more than 36% and in Slovenia from 17% to 33%. In the same period, the proportion of those who attended a lawful demonstration dropped in 5 countries and increased in 4. The most dramatic decrease in the share of demonstrators occurred in Romania, from 18% to 6.8, while the most significant increase is registered in Macedonia, from 9.9% to 18.2%.

**Table 2: Dynamics of petitioning and demonstrating in SEE, 1998-2008**

	Signing a petition			Attending lawful demonstrations		
	1998	2008	Difference 2008-1998	1998	2008	Difference 2008-1998
<b>Bulgaria</b>	5.7%	8.8%	3.1	9.0%	7.6%	-1.4
<b>Romania</b>	14.3%	10.3%	-4.0	18.1%	6.8%	-11.3
<b>Montenegro</b>	13.8%	17.5%	3.7	10.8%	9.2%	-1.6

	Signing a petition			Attending lawful demonstrations		
	1998	2008	Difference 2008-1998	1998	2008	Difference 2008-1998
<b>Albania</b>	23.0%	18.6%	-4.4	16.1%	10.1%	-6.1
<b>Serbia</b>	18.3%	21.1%	2.8	7.0%	12.9%	5.9%
<b>Bosnia Herzegovina</b>	22.6%	22.0%	-0.6	7.8%	6.2%	-1.5
<b>Kosovo*</b>	-	29.5%	-	-	28.1%	-
<b>Slovenia</b>	17.6%	33.0%	15.4	8.7%	12.7%	3.9
<b>Macedonia</b>	14.3%	34.6%	20.3	9.9%	18.2%	8.2
<b>Croatia</b>	41.1%	41.9%	0.8	6.5%	8.4%	1.9

Note: Data represent the % of the respondents reporting to have signed a petition, respectively to have attended a lawful demonstration. Cells marked with grey represent a decrease in signing petitions and attending demonstrations in a specific country. \*Data is not available separately for Kosovo in the 1995/1998 wave of World Values Survey.

The propensity to participate in these two forms of protest is compared based on 25 socio-demographic and attitudinal factors which have been introduced as predictor variables in logistic regression statistical models (See Appendix I, Tables 3 and 4). Overall, in Southeast Europe men tend to participate more than women both in petition signing and demonstrations. For instance, in Macedonia and Romania men are 1.75, respectively 1.56 times more likely to sign petitions, compared to women, all other things being equal. Moreover, gender is a particularly influent predictor of attending demonstrations in countries like Macedonia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria and Kosovo. However, in some countries the effect of gender on protest participation seems to be mediated by attitudinal factors (among which interest in politics is probably the most prominent) which can account for differences between men and women. Overall, the gender gap seems to be smaller in terms of petition signing compared to demonstrating, suggesting women's propensity to engage in less confrontational forms of protest actions.

Age is the second socio-demographic variable used in statistical models to predict protest. When we control for other variables such as education, employment status and political values and attitudes, age seems to have no clearly discernible effect on participation to lawful demonstration. But some variation does occur when we analyze the relationship between age and petitioning. In general, young and adult persons seem to be more prone to sign petitions in SEE, although this pattern does not hold in every country. For instance, in Montenegro persons between 18-29 years old are 1.54 times more likely to have signed a

petition compared with persons over 50 years old. On the other hand, in Macedonia younger persons are (0.64 times) less likely to have signed petitions than their older counterparts, while in Croatia and Slovenia middle-age individuals seem to have a higher propensity to sign petitions. Further longitudinal studies might better elucidate if these differences are due to simple life-cycle effects or do they originate in more profound generational differences coming from divergent patterns of political socialization in different socio-political and economic contexts.

Overall, both petitioners and demonstrators tend to have higher levels of education, compared to non-protestors. The effect of individuals' level of education on their propensity to sign petitions is however more evident in countries like Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania and Kosovo, while education has significant influences on the likelihood to demonstrate only in Bulgaria, controlling for the effect of all the other variables included in this statistical model. However, bivariate analyses reveal that in each of the ten SEE countries, more educated people are more likely to sign petitions and demonstrate than persons with lower levels of education (details not shown here). Despite this fact, the effect of education on protesting seems to lose its statistical significance in the multivariate models presented in tables 3 and 4 (see Appendix I), most probably because the impact of education on citizen participation is mediated by other intervening variables.

People with higher family incomes, relative to their fellow citizens, tend to engage more in signing petitions and this pattern holds in six out of ten SEE countries. However, household revenues seem to have a much lower and sometimes contradictory influence on demonstrating. For instance, in only two countries (Albania and Slovenia) has income a statistically significant effect on participation in peaceful demonstrations. However, in these two cases the patterns are divergent: while in Albania persons with higher family incomes tend to demonstrate more, in Slovenia they are less prone to get involved in street protests. Regardless of income, in general people living in bigger cities tend to sign petitions and demonstrate more than persons living in smaller localities. Students compared to their compatriots tend to have higher propensity to sign petitions particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia and Croatia, and to demonstrate in countries like Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia and Serbia. Being an employed person is also associated with a higher probability to sign petitions and demonstrate suggesting that having a job plays an important social integration role that can provide an individual with the resources and incentives needed to participate.

Members of various organizations tend to engage more often in protest actions. However, membership and participation in different organizations such as trade unions, political parties, civil society organizations and church attendance seems to have uneven influence on people's repertoires of protest actions. Overall, data in tables 3 and 4 indicate that in SEE trade unionists are more prone to participate in demonstrations. On the other hand, members of civil society organizations tend to engage in more legalist ways of protest such as petition signing, while political party members are more inclined to participate both in petitioning and demonstrations, compared to the general public. Yet these patterns significantly vary across countries. For instance, trade union membership is a particularly strong predictor of attending lawful demonstrations in Bulgaria, Croatia and Montenegro, while being insignificant in Albania and Kosovo. Similarly, civil society membership has an important effect on the propensity to sign petitions in Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, Romania, Kosovo, Slovenia and Macedonia, and it does not reach statistical significance in the rest of the SEE countries. Party joiners are more prone to sign petitions in Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia, and to demonstrate in Bosnia Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Serbia and Macedonia, while on the other hand in Kosovo they tend to engage less in street protests compared to their compatriots. In fact, in Kosovo civil society membership and the frequency of church attendance (of those belonging to a Muslim religious denomination) seem to be more important mobilizing factors for engagement in demonstrations, than party and union membership. On the pooled sample, fervent churchgoers in SEE have a slightly higher probability to participate in demonstrations, although frequency of church attendance reaches statistical significance as a predictor of demonstrating only in Bulgaria and Kosovo. Overall, people who discuss politics with their friends are more likely to sign petitions and to demonstrate, while trust in fellow citizens has a minimal effect on petition signing and no significant effect on demonstrating.

Values and attitudes also represent important predictors of protest participation. On average, people who display post-materialist values (i.e. prioritize giving people more say in governance and protecting freedom of speech over maintaining order and fighting rising prices), those who have an inclusive view on nationality (i.e. believe that place of birth, ancestry, knowledge of official language or long time residency in a country are not really important for being 'truly a national' of a country) and have a cosmopolitan sense of belonging (those who say they first belong to the world as a whole or to Europe and not to their country/region/locality) are more likely to sign petitions and demonstrate in SEE. On the other hand, those who have less positive views on immigrants, tend to protest more. Lifestyle

tolerance (measured here as the belief that homosexuality, abortion and divorce can be justified) and more egalitarian views on gender roles (operationalized here as the belief that men do not have more right to jobs than women) are also positively associated with a higher propensity to sign petitions, but not to attend demonstrations. Moreover, petitioners (and in some countries demonstrators too) tend to favor social change to a higher degree than their compatriots. For instance, those who believe that their society should be changed (more radically through revolution or more moderately through reforms) are on average more likely to have signed petitions compared to those who consider that their society should be “valiantly defended against all change” (EVS 2011).

What is however less clear from this analysis is the direction of social changes (i.e. ideological orientations) towards which petitioners consider that their society should move. In SEE, those who place themselves at the extremes of the Left-Right ideological axis tend to sign petitions and to demonstrate more, compared to those who place themselves at the center of this axis. In addition, those who have a clear ideological identification with the Left or with the Right tend to have higher levels of support for democracy as a legitimate political regime, but they are not necessarily more trustful in particular political institutions and organizations (parliament, government, parties). Ideological self-placement at the extremes of the Left-Right axis is particularly salient for attending demonstrations in Romania, Montenegro and Macedonia, and for petition signing in Croatia, Bosnia Herzegovina and Montenegro. However, further studies should elucidate and compare citizens’ interpretations of Left-Right ideological identifications in Western and Eastern Europe. It is very plausible that in the post-communist context people might interpret differently ideological self-identifications, compared to their Western counterparts<sup>4</sup>.

Petition signing and participation to demonstrations are on average higher among persons who were more exposed to political socialization within family. Thus, both forms of protest are more frequent among persons who during their adolescence used to discuss politics with their parents and grew up in families where parents followed the news frequently. In general, those who have higher levels of support for democracy as a legitimate form of governance and who are interested in politics are more likely to have signed petitions and joined demonstrations in all the countries and regions analyzed here.

Although citizens of post-communist SEE do protest less than their Western counterparts, most of the predictors of elite-challenging actions analyzed here perform

---

<sup>4</sup> For instance, in post-communist countries a right wing ideological identification might simply mean having a more liberal, anti-communist orientation.



similarly in East and West. Yet there are several notable differences between protesters living in these regions. For instance, in SEE countries men are more likely to sign petitions while in Western Europe women are more prone to petitioning. Younger persons (15-29 years old) are less likely to sign petitions in Western Europe while in SEE they have a higher probability to sign petitions compared to older persons (above 50 years old). In SEE, the bigger the size of locality in which one lives, the higher the chances of that person to have signed a petition, while in WE this predictor is statistically insignificant. Overall, students from Western countries are more prone to demonstrate compared to the rest of the population of their countries. Overall, in SEE this is not necessarily the case, although in some countries from this region students are substantially more prone to protest than the general public. In addition, in SEE fervent churchgoers tend to protest more compared to those who attend religious services less often or not at all. The situation is reversed in WE where, on average, attending religious services seems to decrease one's likelihood to protest. In terms of ideological positioning, overall both in SEE and WE right wingers tend to be more frequent churchgoers than leftists. Tolerant attitudes towards immigration have also potentially divergent effects on one's propensity to demonstrate. In Western Europe demonstrators tend to have a somewhat more positive attitude towards immigrants, compared with their fellow citizens, while in South Eastern Europe the situation seems to be reversed. Overall, Western demonstrators tend to have a stronger belief that their societies should be changed, compared to demonstrators in SEE.

In terms of the relationship between ideological self-placement on the Left-Right axis and protest participation, one can note divergent patterns between South-Eastern and Western citizens. In SEE both those who identify themselves with the Left and with the Right tend to sign petitions and demonstrate more than those who place themselves at the center of the Left-Right axis. On the other hand, in Western Europe "leftists" tend to demonstrate more than "centrists", while on their turn "rightists" tend to demonstrate less than "centrists". In general, western Europeans who distrust political institutions are more prone to protest compared to their fellow citizens who have higher levels of institutional trust. Overall, in South Eastern Europe there seems to be no significant relationship between trust in political institutions and the propensity to protest.

### **Developments during the Economic Crisis: a Closer Look on Romania and Slovenia**

Romania and Slovenia have been selected for a closer comparative analysis of protest dynamics during the recent economic crisis. The two countries are significantly different on several control variables including institutional set-up, trajectories and speed of transition to democracy, and levels of economic development, while being similar in terms of the severity with which the recent economic contraction hit their economies and also in terms of social and political responses to the crisis. These features qualify Slovenia and Romania for a “most different cases” comparative analysis that aims to explore patterns of protest participation during the economic crisis.

Post-socialist transformations in Slovenia have been frequently qualified as a success story due to steady pace of democratization and increased economic prosperity compared with other former communist countries (Feldmann 2006, Bukowski 1999). By contrast, post-communist Romania was most often considered a regional “laggard” (along with Bulgaria) in terms of building and consolidating liberal democracy, developing a prosperous nation, as well in the process of joining the EU (Noutcheva and Bechev 2008). Despite different levels of economic development at the outset of the crisis, Romania and Slovenia went after 2008 through an equally dramatic economic contraction. According to Eurostat data<sup>5</sup>, the GDP of Slovenia declined in 2009 by 7.8% compared with 2008, while the GDP of Romania decreased with 7.1%. Unemployment data follows somewhat similar trends in both countries. In Romania unemployment rates increased from 5.8 in 2008 to 6.9 in 2009 and then to 7.3 in 2010 while in Slovenia unemployment rates grew from 4.4 in 2008 to 6.9 in 2009 and 7.3 in 2010. Not only the severity of the crisis is comparable in Slovenia and Romania, but also the episodes of political instability and relatively long periods of social unrest that followed the economic contraction. Although the two countries had divergent trends of protest mobilization during their post-socialist transition, protest mobilization patterns seem to converge during the economic crisis. These developments may provide evidence that countries which have been equally hard hit by the crisis tend to experience similar political and social developments, regardless of previous differences between them. This could be so because as Bellinger and Arce (2011) have pointed out, literatures of contentious politics suggest that societal forces react to changes in economic conditions (i.e. decline) and economic policy (i.e. austerity) rather than overall levels of economic development or economic liberalization policy in general.

---

<sup>5</sup> Eurostat, <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tec00115>, accessed 15.02.2015.

Indeed, Romania recorded in 2012 a revival of citizen activism after a relatively long period of political apathy (Tătar, 2105). Massive demonstrations erupted in January 2012 in most major cities in Romania. Protests have eventually led in February 2012 to the resignation of the center-right government that has adopted the austerity measures in 2010. Other protests started in the spring of 2012 against shale gas drilling projects, while the summer of 2012 has witnessed further street demonstrations. Similarly, a new wave of protests swept through Slovenia in late 2012 and 2013 after the center-right coalition government adopted a package of austerity measures in May 2012, including cuts in public sector wages and benefits. While both in Romania and Slovenia the first social reactions to austerity measures were economic protests organized by trade unions, after a period of accumulated grievances new social movements animated mass demonstrations against wider political issues, including political corruption and lack of governmental efficiency and responsiveness.

In order to compare the profile of petitioners and demonstrators before and during the economic crisis and show the robustness of results, the logistic regression statistical models contained similar predictor variables<sup>6</sup> coming from EVS 2008 and WVS 2010-14 datasets. The results are presented in Appendix 1, Tables 3 and 4, which contain the Exp(B) logistic regression coefficients (odds ratio) for the determinants of signing petitions and attending demonstrations in Romania in 2008 and 2012 and Slovenia in 2008 and 2011.

The strongest predictor for reporting petition signing and attending demonstrations in Romania in 2012 was interest in politics, while in 2008 this variable was a significant predictor only for demonstrating and not for petitioning. This indicates a potential increase in the explanatory power of this factor, meaning that during the economic crisis, Romanians more interested in politics were increasingly more likely to protest than those who were not interested in politics, controlling for all other factors in the model. In Slovenia in 2011, interest in politics was also the strongest predictor for attending demonstrations and the second strongest (after education) for petition signing, while in 2008 it was a significant determinant only for petitioning.

Civil society membership is another factor which seems to have gained more leverage particularly in explaining participation to demonstrations during the economic crisis. In 2011-2012, in Romania CSO members were 1.7 more likely, while in Slovenia they were over 2

---

<sup>6</sup> Four items included in EVS 2008 were not asked in WVS 2010-14 namely: frequency of political discussions, index of inclusive views on nationality, scale of opposition to social change, and the index of political socialization within family. Despite these limitations, the overall explanatory power of the statistical models employed to predict both petitioning and demonstrating in 2008 and 2011/12 is comparable and

times more likely to report participation in demonstrations than non-members, controlling for other factors in the model. On the other hand, civil society membership was a non-significant predictor of attending demonstrations before the economic crisis, when in both countries members of CSO were only more prone to sign petitions than non-members. Although initially protests might have been animated by unions that were voicing discontent over economic hardships and austerity measures, it seems that subsequently other social agents such as civil society organizations (CSOs) started to mobilize people for protests targeting broader issues (e.g. political corruption, environmental protection, urban planning, etc.). While the economic downturn could have imposed constraints in the funding resources of many of these organizations and networks, both in Slovenia and Romania the mobilization capacity of CSOs seems to have increased after 2008. Overall, membership in civil society organizations significantly grew in both countries. Data from the WVS/EVS surveys show that in Romania the share of respondents who reported membership in at least one CSO<sup>7</sup> rose from 19% in 2008 to almost 30% in 2012, while in Slovenia it grew from 46% in 2008 to over 55% in 2011. Students were also increasingly more likely to participate in street demonstrations during the economic crisis in both countries. However, data on Romania reveals that among younger age cohorts, only students and those connected with various social networks and organizations and having certain motivations were particularly more prone to participate in protests. In addition, those living in large cities have also higher chances of both signing petitions and attending demonstrations than those living in small rural localities from Romania. On the other hand, in Slovenia employed persons were almost 3 times more likely to demonstrate than the rest the adult populations, all other things being equal.

Education is the strongest predictor of reporting signing petitions in Slovenia and the second most important one (after interest in politics) in Romania, controlling for all the other variables in the model. In both countries, those expressing higher levels of support for the democratic system of governance during the economic crisis were also more likely to report petition signing than those supporting authoritarian or technocratic forms of governance. In 2008 this factor had no statistically significant effect on petitioning in neither of the two countries. Overall, the predictors of joining street demonstrations and signing petitions seem to perform in a rather similar way before and during the economic crisis in Slovenia and

---

<sup>7</sup> The EVS/WVS ask about membership in an extensive list of voluntary organizations ranging from environmental, consumer, religious, sport, art or recreational organizations to professional associations, humanitarian or charitable organizations and mutual aid groups.

Romania. However, in the context of an overall increase in protest mobilization, the effects of some predictors appear to have been elevated.

## **Conclusion**

The main results of analyses carried out in this paper suggest three interwoven pathways to protest actions in post-communist SEE. First, within the instrumental path manifested mainly through attentiveness to, and interest in politics, protest is seen as a means to achieve certain goals, such as to protect or increase specific rights. Second, following the logic of identification, manifested in data used here mainly through ideological and value self-identification people protest to express their indignation when their values have been violated (Stekelenburg, Klandermans, and Dijk 2009). Yet the two logics are not mutually exclusive, but rather complementary. Third, mobilizing contexts are needed to create actual opportunities for protest action. Membership in various civil society organizations and belonging to different politicized social networks provide the mobilizing context in which both instrumental and ideological motives can lead to protest action.

Although in SEE people protest less than citizens living in Western Europe, protesters in both regions tend to have similar socio-demographical and attitudinal profiles. Contrary to what radical disaffection theories might suggest, protesters in post-communist SEE are on average democratically oriented citizens of their countries. They tend to support democracy as a form of government and generally ask for more open, responsive and accountable democratic governance. However, this finding should not be interpreted in a deterministic way, but rather in probabilistic terms. In other words, by no means my results imply that only democratically oriented citizens do protest, while authoritarian minded people do not. Without excluding the protest participation of some extremist segments of the population (sometimes highly publicized in the media), my results do suggest however that in this region, as well in as Western Europe, those who tend to support democracy as the only legitimate system of governance are more likely to protest than those who prefer authoritarian alternatives to democracy. And this positive relationship between what David Easton (1975) called “diffuse democratic support” and protest participation holds even after we control for the effect of various socio-demographic and attitudinal factors. In the same time, protesters in this region also tend to have stronger ideological identifications on the Left-Right axis compared to non-protesters, although the left-right semantics might have different meanings in Western and Eastern Europe. Moreover, they usually do not come from the lower strata of

the society as disaffected radicalism theories would predict, but rather from the higher income, better educated and post-materialist segments of the population that are more open to the idea of social change. In this sense, protesters from SEE do resemble to a certain degree to their western counterparts.

While the public opinion data used in the paper (i.e. World Values Surveys and European values Surveys) are useful in analyzing general features of protesters by comparing those who have demonstrated or signed petitions with those who have not, this kind of data do not tell us much about what people were protesting against (van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013a). Despite these limitations, the findings presented in this paper do explore some of the factors that can account for the citizens' preference for certain forms of protest actions versus others. Furthermore, since this research shows that people are more likely to engage in protests when they are more interested in politics, when they have certain values and ideological orientations and when they are socially embedded in various mobilizing networks, it opens new directions for studies that can test the robustness of these findings in different contexts, such as the recent economic crisis. This paper made a first step in this direction by exploring the patterns of protest politics during the economic crisis through a comparative analysis of Slovenia and Romania. As some research suggest, economic hardships and employment insecurities "generate political apathy as people's efforts are devoted to participating in the market, and they have less time to become politically active" (Oxhorn 2009, 228). However, worsening economic conditions and governmental policies that imposed austerity programs during the recent economic recession created new mobilization opportunities for existent and newly emerged social actors that managed to politically activate increasing segments of the population. The cases of Slovenia and Romania seem to support this pattern of antigovernment mobilization since in both countries social movements spread during the economic crisis and protests became an increasingly used means to voice popular discontent against austerity, but also against corruption and bad governance in general.

## References

- Alexander, Damon Timothy, Jo Barraket, Jenny M. Lewis, and Mark Considine. 2012. "Civic Engagement and Associationalism: The Impact of Group Membership Scope versus Intensity of Participation." *European Sociological Review* no. 28 (1):43-58. doi: 10.1093/esr/jcq047.
- Bellinger, Paul T., and Arce Moises. 2011. "Protest and Democracy in Latin America's Market Era." *Political Research Quarterly* no. 64 (3):688-704.
- Bernhagen, Patrick, and Michael Marsh. 2007. "Voting and Protesting: Explaining Citizen Participation in Old and New European Democracies." *Democratization* no. 14 (1):44-72.
- Blais, Andre. 2007. "Turnout in Elections." In *Political Behavior*, edited by Russel J. Dalton and Hans-Dieter Klingeman, 621-635. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Bukowski, Charles. 1999. "Slovenia's transition to democracy: theory and practice." *East European Quarterly* no. 33 (1):69-99.
- Cantijoch, Marta, David Cutts, and Rachel Gibson. 2015. "Moving Slowly up the Ladder of Political Engagement: A 'Spill-over' Model of Internet Participation." *The British Journal of Politics & International Relations*:n/a-n/a. doi: 10.1111/1467-856x.12067.
- Dalton, Russel J. 2013. *Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. 6th ed. Washington DC: CQ Press.
- Dalton, Russell J., and Christian Welzel. 2014. *The Civic Culture Transformed: From Allegiant to Assertive Citizens*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Deth, Jan W. van. 2006. "Democracy and involvement: the benevolent aspects of social participation." In *Political Disaffection in Contemporary Democracies: Social Capital, Institutions, and Politics*, edited by Mariano Torcal and Jose Ramon Montero, 101-129. New York: Routledge.
- Diani, Mario. 2009. "The Structural Bases of Protest Events: Multiple Memberships and Civil Society Networks in the 15 February 2003 Anti-War Demonstrations." *Acta Sociologica* no. 52 (1):63-83. doi: 10.1177/0001699308100634.
- Easton, David. 1975. "A Re-assessment of the Concept of Political Support." *British Journal of Political Science* no. 5 (04):435-457. doi: 10.1017/S0007123400008309.
- EVS. 2011. European Values Study 2008: Integrated Dataset (EVS 2008). edited by GESIS Data Archive. Cologne.
- Feldmann, Magnus. 2006. "Emerging Varieties of Capitalism in Transition Countries: Industrial Relations and Wage Bargaining in Estonia and Slovenia." *Comparative Political Studies* no. 39 (7):829-854. doi: 10.1177/0010414006288261.
- Fillieule, Olivier. 1997. *Stratégies de la rue. Les manifestations en France*. Paris: Presses de Science Po.
- Gibson, Rachel, and Marta Cantijoch. 2013. "Conceptualizing and Measuring Participation in the Age of the Internet: Is Online Political Engagement Really Different to Offline?" *The Journal of Politics* no. 75 (03):701-716. doi: 10.1017/S0022381613000431.
- Guérin, Daniel, François Petry, and Jean Crête. 2004. "Tolerance, protest and democratic transition: Survey evidence from 13 post-communist countries." *European Journal of Political Research* no. 43 (3):371-395. doi: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2004.00158.x.
- Inglehart, Ronald. 1977. *The silent revolution : changing values and political styles among Western publics*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, Ronald. 1990. *Culture shift in advanced industrial society*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, Ronald. 1997. *Modernization and postmodernization : cultural, economic, and political change in 43 societies*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Johnston, Hank, and Paul Almeida, eds. 2006. *Latin American Social Movements: Globalization, Democratization and Transnational Networks*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

- Kirbiš, Andrej. 2013. "Political Participation and Non-democratic Political Culture in Western Europe, East-Central Europe and Post-Yugoslav Countries." In *Democracy in Transition: Political Participation in the European Union*, edited by Kyriakos N. Demetriou, 225-251. Heidelberg: Springer.
- Klandermans, Bert. 2004. "The Demand and Supply of Participation: Social Psychological Correlates of Participation in Social Movements." In *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, edited by David Snow, Sarah A Soule and Hanspeter Kriesi, 360-379. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
- Krajnc, Marina Tavčar, Sergej Flere, and Andrej Kirbiš. 2012. "Is Protest Participation in Post-Yugoslav Countries Motivated by Pro-democratic Political Culture? A Cross-National Study." *The Western Balkans Policy Review* no. 2 (2):95-117.
- Kriesi, Hanspeter. 2008. "Political Mobilisation, Political Participation and the Power of the Vote." *West European Politics* no. 31 (1-2):147-168. doi: 10.1080/01402380701834762.
- Lambright, Kristina T., Pamela A. Mischen, and Craig B. Laramée. 2009. "Building Trust in Public and Nonprofit Networks: Personal, Dyadic, and Third-Party Influences." *The American Review of Public Administration*:0275074008329426. doi: 10.1177/0275074008329426.
- Levi, Margaret. 1996. "Social and Unsocial Capital: A Review Essay of Robert Putnam's Making Democracy Work." *Politics Society* no. 24 (1):45-55. doi: 10.1177/0032329296024001005.
- Martin, Greg. 2015. *Understanding Social Movements*. London: Routledge.
- McAdam, D. 1982. *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970*. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.
- McAdam, D., J.D. McCarthy, and M.N. Zald. 1996. *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- McClurg, Scott D. 2003. "Social networks and political participation: The role of social interaction in explaining political participation." *Political Research Quarterly* no. 56:448-464.
- Newton, K., and J-R. Montero. 2007. "Patterns of political and social participation in Europe." In *Measuring attitudes cross-nationally: lessons from the European Social Survey*, edited by V R. et al. Jowell, 205-238. Los Angeles: Sage Publications.
- Newton, Kenneth. 2001. "Trust, Social Capital, Civil Society, and Democracy." *International Political Science Review/ Revue internationale de science pol* no. 22 (2):201-214. doi: 10.1177/0192512101222004.
- Norris, Pippa. 2002. *Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Norris, Pippa, Stefan Walgrave, and Peter Van Aelst. 2006. "Does protest signify disaffection? Demonstrators in a postindustrial democracy." In *Political Disaffection in Contemporary Democracies: Social Capital, Institutions, and Politics*, edited by Mariano Torcal and Jose Ramon Montero, 279-307. London: Routledge.
- Noutcheva, Gergana, and Dimitar Bechev. 2008. "The Successful Laggards: Bulgaria and Romania's Accession to the EU." *East European Politics & Societies* no. 22 (1):114-144. doi: 10.1177/0888325407311793.
- Opp, Karl-Dieter, and Bernhard Kittel. 2010. "The Dynamics of Political Protest: Feedback Effects and Interdependence in the Explanation of Protest Participation." *European Sociological Review* no. 26 (1):97-109. doi: 10.1093/esr/jcp008.
- Oser, Jennifer, Marc Hooghe, and Sofie Marien. 2013. "Is Online Participation Distinct from Offline Participation? A Latent Class Analysis of Participation Types and Their Stratification." *Political Research Quarterly* no. 66 (1):91-101. doi: 10.1177/1065912912436695.
- Oxhorn, Philip. 2009. "Beyond neoliberalism? Latin America's new crossroads." In *Beyond neoliberalism in Latin America? Societies and politics at the crossroads*, edited by J. Burdick, P. Oxhorn and K. Roberts, 217-234. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.



- Pattie, Charles, and Ron Johnston. 1998. "Voter turnout at the British General Elections of 1992: Rational choice, social standing or political efficacy?" *European Journal of Political Research* no. 33 (2):263-283.
- Petrovic, Igor, Jacqueliën van Stekelenburg, and Bert Klandermans. 2014. "Political Socialisation and Social Movements: Escaping the Political Past?" In *The Palgrave Handbook of Global Political Psychology*, edited by Paul Nesbitt-Larking, Catarina Kinnvall, Tereza Capelos and Henk Dekker, 403-422. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Putnam, Robert. 2000. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Putnam, Robert D., Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Nanetti. 1993. *Making democracy work : civic traditions in modern Italy*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Quintelier, Ellen, and Jan W. van Deth. 2014. "Supporting Democracy: Political Participation and Political Attitudes. Exploring Causality Using Panel Data." *Political Studies* no. 62:153-171. doi: 10.1111/1467-9248.12097.
- Rosenstone, S. J., and J. M. Hansen. 1993. *Mobilization, Participation and Democracy in America*. New York: Macmillan.
- Rucht, Dieter. 2007. "The Spread of Protest Politics." In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior*, edited by Russell Dalton and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, 708-723. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Schussman, Alan, and Sarah A. Soule. 2005. "Process and Protest: Accounting for Individual Protest Participation." *Social Forces* no. 84 (2):1083-1108.
- Stekelenburg, Jacqueliën van, Bert Klandermans, and Wilco W. van Dijk. 2009. "Context Matters: Explaining How and Why Mobilizing Context Influences Motivational Dynamics." *Journal of Social Issues* no. 65 (4):815--838.
- Tarrow, S. 1998. *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*. 2nd edn. ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tarrow, Sidney. 2012. *Strangers at the Gates: Movements and States in Contentious Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tătar, Marius I. 2006. *Importing Democracy from Abroad: International Assistance for Civil Society in Romania*. Oradea: Oradea University Press.
- Tătar, Marius I. 2010. "Integration, Identity and Participation in a Changing Europe." *Journal of Social Research and Policy* no. 1(2): 47-62.
- Tătar, Marius Ioan. 2015a. "Rediscovering Protest: Reflections on the Early Development and Consequences of the Early 2012 Romanian Protests." *Journal of Identity and Migration Studies* no. 9(2): 62-85.
- Tătar, Marius Ioan. 2015b. "Selective or Generic Activism? Types of Participants, Political Action Repertoires and Mobilisation Capacity in a Post-Communist Society." *Europe-Asia Studies* no. 67 (8):1251-1281. doi: 10.1080/09668136.2015.1075191.
- Tătar, Marius Ioan (2016) 'Democratization and Political Alienation: The Legacies of Post-Communist Transition in Romania' *Journal of Identity and Migration Studies*, no. 10(2): 85-108.
- Tilly, Charles, and Sidney Tarrow. 2007. *Contentious Politics*. Boulder, CO: Paradigm.
- Uhlin, Anders. 2009. "Which Characteristics of Civil Society Organizations Support What Aspects of Democracy? Evidence from Post-communist Latvia." *International Political Science Review/Revue internationale de science pol* no. 30 (3):271-295. doi: 10.1177/0192512109105639.
- Uslaner, Eric M. 2004. *Bowling Almost Alone: Political Participation in a New Democracy*. In *ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Emerging Repertoires of Political Action: Toward a Systematic Study of Postconventional Forms of Participation*. Uppsala, Sweden, April 13-18, 2004.
- van Stekelenburg, Jacqueliën, and Bert Klandermans. 2013a. "Fitting Demand and Supply: How Identification Brings Appeals and Motives Together." *Social Movement Studies*:1-25. doi: 10.1080/14742837.2013.843448.

- van Stekelenburg, Jacqueliën, and Bert Klandermans. 2013b. "The social psychology of protest." *Current Sociology* no. 61 (5-6):886-905. doi: 10.1177/0011392113479314.
- Vaughan-Whitehead, Daniel. 1999. *Albania in Crisis*. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Verba, Sidney, K. Schlozman, and H. E Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Wallace, Caire, Florian Pichler, and Christian Haerpfer. 2012. "Changing Patterns of Civil Society in Europe and America 1995-2005." *East European Politics & Societies* no. 26 (1):3-19. doi: 10.1177/0888325411401380.
- Woshinsky, Oliver H. 2008. *Explaining Politics: Culture, Institutions and Political Behavior*. New York: Routledge.
- Xenos, Michael, Ariadne Vromen, and Brian D. Loader. 2014. "The great equalizer? Patterns of social media use and youth political engagement in three advanced democracies." *Information, Communication & Society* no. 17 (2):151-167. doi: 10.1080/1369118x.2013.871318.
- Zakaria, Patty. 2013. "Is Corruption an Enemy of Civil Society? The case of Central and Eastern Europe." *International Political Science Review* no. 34:351-371. doi: 10.1177/0192512112466880.

# APPENDIX I

**Table 3: Explaining petition signing in post-communist SEE (Exp(B) logistic regression coefficients)**

	Albania 2008	Bosnia Herz. 2008	Bulgaria 2008	Croatia 2008	Montenegro 2008	Romania 2008	Romania 2012	Serbia 2008	Slovenia 2008	Slovenia 2011	Macedonia 2008	Kosovo 2008	SEE <sup>a</sup> 2008	WE <sup>b</sup> 2008	CEE <sup>c</sup> 2008	FSU <sup>d</sup> 2008
Gender (men)	1.16	0.99	1.12	0.98	0.96	1.56*	1.04	1.32	0.79	0.64**	1.75***	1.01	1.14**	0.88***	1.08	1.09
Age	50+ (ref.)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	18-29	0.94	1.29	0.77	1.19	1.54*	1.39	1.22	1.53	0.84	0.64*	0.88	1.16*	0.72***	0.87	0.55***
	30-49	0.80	1.07	0.96	1.42*	0.96	1.33	0.98	1.46*	1.43	0.81	1.11	1.16**	0.97	1.01	0.82*
Level of Education	1.10	1.18*	1.33**	1.08	1.04	1.31**	1.32***	1.13	1.38***	1.27***	1.01	1.21**	1.17***	1.16***	1.04	1.06
Household Income	1.12*	1.19*	1.24*	0.99	1.34**	1.12*	0.99	1.02	1.07	0.88**	1.14*	1.09	1.14***	1.07***	1.07**	0.94*
Size of locality	1.01	1.07*	0.97	1.12***	1.14**	0.94	1.13**	1.09**	1.03	1.01	1.17***	1.24***	1.07***	0.99	1.02	1.05***
Student	1.00	3.26***	1.54	1.89*	1.66	2.07	1.14	1.46	1.99*	2.85**	1.25	0.78	1.48***	1.16*	0.79	1.01
Employed	1.26	1.64**	1.76*	1.02	1.34	1.63*	1.22	1.24	1.45*	1.51*	1.08	1.35	1.18**	1.16***	0.95	1.23**
Trade unionist	0.59	1.11	1.63	1.71*	2.76**	1.31	2.30**	1.45	1.12	1.16	2.37**	0.42*	1.10	1.18***	1.62***	0.95
Political Party Member	1.47	1.70	4.53***	1.29	2.02*	1.53	0.83	2.19**	1.75	0.99	1.67*	1.05	1.51***	1.20*	1.25	1.93***
Civil Society Member	3.29***	1.83**	1.44	1.25	1.08	1.60*	2.09***	1.21	1.41*	1.35	1.37*	1.58*	1.56***	1.54***	1.71***	1.37***
Frequency of Church attendance	1.00	1.06	0.98	1.03	1.11*	0.98	0.98	1.03	0.99	1.06	0.96	0.99	1.03*	0.94***	1.05***	1.03
Political Discussion	1.99**	0.84	1.00	1.38*	1.22	1.47	NA	1.49*	1.41*	NA	0.93	1.04	1.20***	1.27***	1.03	1.37**
Scale of Trust in other people	0.96	1.01	1.02	1.02	0.99	1.12**	1.01	1.02	1.04	1.05	1.00	1.02	1.02**	1.04***	1.01	0.97*
Index of Immigration tolerance	0.99	0.99**	1.01	1.00	0.99*	0.98**	0.84	1.00	1.00	0.82	0.99**	1.02**	0.99***	1.00	1.00	1.00
Index of Lifestyle tolerance	1.05***	1.05***	1.02	1.04***	1.02*	1.01	1.02	1.02	1.05***	0.60	1.01	1.03*	1.02***	1.03***	1.04***	1.02**
Scale of Gender Role Traditionalism	0.73**	0.82*	0.74*	0.85	0.96	0.69**	0.93	1.06	1.03	0.80	0.96	1.31***	0.92**	0.87***	0.87***	1.10**
Index of Post-materialism	1.25	0.96	1.28	1.05	1.61**	1.97***	1.35	0.97	0.95	1.17	0.77*	1.08	1.09*	1.15***	1.27***	1.22**
Cosmopolitan sense of belonging	1.15	1.57	1.00	1.12	1.55	1.88	1.33	1.74**	1.09	1.31	0.95	3.22***	1.52***	1.00	0.93	1.31*
Index of Inclusive views on Nationality	0.95	1.06**	1.14**	1.01	0.97	1.08*	NA	1.10***	1.01	NA	1.06*	1.12***	1.06***	1.03***	1.01	0.99

	Albania 2008	Bosnia Herz. 2008	Bulgaria 2008	Croatia 2008	Montenegro 2008	Romania 2008	Romania 2012	Serbia 2008	Slovenia 2008	Slovenia 2011	Macedonia 2008	Kosovo 2008	SEE <sup>a</sup> 2008	WE <sup>b</sup> 2008	CEE <sup>c</sup> 2008	FSU <sup>d</sup> 2008
Scale of opposition to social change	1.28	1.24	0.61*	0.65**	0.65*	1.26	NA	0.89	0.96	NA	1.06	0.62**	0.86**	0.84***	0.89	0.88
Ideological self-placement on the Left-Right scale																
Center (ref.)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Left	0.56**	1.71*	0.82	1.66**	1.22	1.56	1.70*	1.02	1.34	0.98	1.07	1.04	1.26**	1.41***	1.32***	0.97
Right	0.66	1.79*	1.21	2.10***	2.62***	0.94	1.54	1.59*	1.38	0.60	1.08	1.59*	1.42**	1.08	1.34***	1.60***
Index of Trust in Political Institutions	0.96	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.82***	1.08	0.97	1.03	0.95	0.91	1.02	1.01	1.02	0.97***	1.00	1.03*
Index of Political Socialization within family	1.09**	0.95	1.04	1.04	1.03	0.97	NA	1.11***	1.02	NA	1.05*	1.05*	1.05***	1.05***	1.03**	1.04***
Scale of Political Interest	2.25***	1.44***	1.16	1.23**	1.97***	1.19	1.54***	1.31**	1.29**	1.29**	1.73***	1.57***	1.40***	1.35***	1.45***	1.42***
Index of Democratic Support	1.01	1.24***	1.06	1.01	1.01	0.98	1.19**	1.03	1.02	1.12*	0.96	1.02	1.06***	1.02**	1.24***	1.05**
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>	.331	.260	.204	.214	.262	.216	.246	.214	.290	.223	.243	.282	.191	.257	.154	.082
N	1534	1512	1500	1498	1516	1489	1495	1512	1366	1055	1494	1601	15022	24980	10817	10528

*Note:* Data represent Exp (B) coefficients of a binomial logistic regression model with the dependent variable *Signing a petition* having two categories: 1=Yes and 0=No (non-petitioners is the reference category). Exp (B) coefficients are odds ratios: values higher than 1 represent a positive effect, values below 1 represent a negative effect of a predictor variable on the dependent variable, controlling for the effect of all other variables included in the statistical model. The statistical significance of coefficients is presented as: \*p<0.05, \*\*p<0.01, \*\*\*p<0.001. For nominal or ordinal predictors, the reference category's parameter is set to 0, because it is redundant. Example of reading data: *men*, compared to *women*, are 1.14 times more likely to have signed a petition, all other things being equal (see column 12, line 2 in this table).

<sup>a</sup>SEE here includes: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, FYR Macedonia and Kosovo.

<sup>b</sup>WE here includes: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Malta, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

<sup>c</sup>CEE here includes: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovak Republic.

<sup>d</sup>FSU here includes: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine.

*Data source:* EVS 2008.

**Table 4: Explaining participation to lawful demonstrations in post-communist SEE (Exp(B) logistic regression coefficients)**

		Albania 2008	Bosnia Herz. 2008	Bulgaria 2008	Croatia 2008	Montenegro 2008	Romania 2008	Romania 2012	Serbia 2008	Slovenia 2008	Slovenia 2011	Macedonia 2008	Kosovo 2008	SEE <sup>a</sup> 2008	WE <sup>b</sup> 2008	CEE <sup>c</sup> 2008	FSU <sup>d</sup> 2008
Gender(men)		1.51*	1.84*	1.66*	1.17	1.24	1.51	2.16***	1.34	2.01***	1.14	2.10***	1.31*	1.58***	1.18***	1.18*	1.17*
Age	50+ (ref)																
	18-29	1.36	0.71	0.41	0.85	1.06	0.56	0.22***	0.87	0.52	0.51	0.66	1.04	1.06	0.91	0.44***	0.56***
	30-49	0.78	0.82	0.88	1.30	0.75	0.78	0.55*	0.93	1.29	0.71	0.68*	0.92	1.01	0.95	0.69***	0.69***
Level of Education		1.05	0.99	1.39*	1.15	1.05	1.13	1.18*	1.16	0.96	1.10	1.09	1.04	1.11***	1.10***	1.19***	1.16***
Household Income		1.20**	1.24	1.15	0.95	1.03	0.94	0.99	0.95	0.87*	0.88	1.01	0.95	0.97	0.99	0.93*	0.96
Size of locality		1.05	1.13*	0.89*	1.11*	1.06	0.99	1.17**	1.15***	1.06	1.11	1.14***	1.30***	1.12***	1.04***	1.14***	1.07***
Student		1.15	3.17**	6.70**	0.78	1.48	1.02	3.20*	2.65*	3.17*	5.63**	0.65	0.75	1.10	1.62***	1.06	0.95
Employed		1.32	1.23	2.35**	0.95	1.28	1.80*	1.25	1.83**	1.01	2.94**	1.06	1.32	1.14*	1.17***	0.98	0.99
Trade unionist		0.52	2.02	4.02***	4.04***	3.88***	1.93	1.20	1.27	1.88**	2.02*	2.59**	0.81	1.84***	1.26***	1.90***	1.11
Political Party Member		1.60	3.94***	2.40*	2.97*	0.71	2.39*	1.70	2.76***	1.93	0.43	1.67*	0.41*	1.42***	1.41***	1.32	2.12***
Civil Society Member		2.66***	2.04*	1.27	0.94	0.69	1.52	1.70*	1.87**	1.06	2.07**	1.25	2.18***	1.23**	1.32***	1.50***	1.13
Frequency of Church attendance		1.07	1.02	1.22*	1.08	1.09	1.15	1.03	0.92	0.99	1.02	0.92	1.31***	1.10***	0.98**	0.98	1.02
Political Discussion		2.75**	0.54*	0.97	1.32	1.00	1.05	NA	1.17	1.62*	NA	1.00	1.48*	1.24**	1.40***	1.43**	1.15
Scale of Trust in other people		0.97	1.04	1.11*	0.99	1.04	1.08	1.03	1.01	1.10*	0.96	1.00	0.96	1.01	0.97***	1.04*	1.02
Index of Immigration tolerance		1.02	1.00	0.98	0.99	1.00	1.00	0.95	1.00	1.01	0.91	0.98***	0.98**	0.98***	1.01***	1.00	1.00
Index of Lifestyle tolerance		0.99	0.99	1.03	1.04*	0.98	0.98	1.01	1.04*	1.04*	0.99	1.02	0.99	1.00	1.02***	1.00	1.01*
Scale of Gender Role Traditionalism		0.85	1.13	0.99	0.71	0.96	0.89	0.98	0.93	0.83	0.91	0.94	1.21**	1.02	1.02	1.00	0.98
Index of Post- materialism		1.15	1.40	1.29	1.13	1.78**	1.29	1.31	0.98	1.29	1.46	0.97	0.85	1.19***	1.13***	1.45***	1.32***
Cosmopolitan sense of belonging		0.81	1.45	1.08	1.07	1.32	1.76	1.83**	1.68*	1.37	1.01	1.18	2.71***	1.72***	1.16**	1.09	1.44**
Index of Inclusive views on Nationality		0.97	1.15***	1.05	1.02	0.98	1.17**	NA	1.01	1.00	NA	1.03	1.05	1.05***	1.04***	1.02	0.96**
Scale of opposition to social change		1.65*	0.98	0.55*	0.73	0.47***	1.36	NA	1.00	0.90	NA	0.94	0.79	0.93	0.76***	0.93	0.79**

		Albania 2008	Bosnia Herz. 2008	Bulgaria 2008	Croatia 2008	Montenegro 2008	Romania 2008	Romania 2012	Serbia 2008	Slovenia 2008	Slovenia 2011	Macedonia 2008	Kosovo 2008	SEE <sup>a</sup> 2008	WE <sup>b</sup> 2008	CEE <sup>c</sup> 2008	FSU <sup>d</sup> 2008
Ideological self- placement on the Left-Right scale	Center (ref.)																
	Left	0.85	1.96*	1.11	1.84*	1.78*	4.78***	1.38	1.17	1.33	0.95	2.22***	1.41	1.52***	2.33***	1.15	0.84
	Right	1.83*	1.43	1.61	1.40	2.43**	1.70	1.87**	1.76*	0.65	0.80	1.97***	1.71**	1.54***	0.78***	1.48***	1.47***
Index of Trust in Political Institutions		0.96	1.04	0.79*	0.94	0.79***	0.98	1.02	0.93	0.93	0.99	0.96	0.93**	1.02	0.97***	0.89***	0.96**
Index of Political Socialization within family		1.09*	1.00	1.06	1.01	1.09*	1.15**	NA	1.07*	1.05	NA	1.00	1.08**	1.08***	1.04***	1.05***	1.04**
Scale of Political Interest		1.97***	1.37*	1.66**	1.46**	2.02***	1.64***	1.53***	1.59***	1.26	1.75***	1.72***	1.20*	1.52***	1.41***	1.38***	1.49***
Index of Democratic Support		0.96	1.13	1.15*	1.09	0.91	1.08	1.01	1.17**	0.95	1.09	1.05	1.16***	1.09***	1.11***	1.03	1.08***
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup>		.293	.189	.296	.192	.238	.251	.211	.284	.166	.151	.262	.268	.172	.229	.127	.106
N		1534	1512	1500	1498	1516	1489	1495	1512	1366	1055	1494	1601	15022	24980	10817	10528

*Note:* Data represent Exp (B) coefficients of a binomial logistic regression model with the dependent variable *Participation to lawful demonstrations* having two categories: 1=Yes and 0=No (non-demonstrators is the reference category). Exp (B) coefficients are odds ratios: values higher than 1 represent a positive effect, values below 1 represent a negative effect of a predictor variable on the dependent variable, controlling for the effect of all other variables included in the statistical model. The statistical significance of coefficients is presented as: \*p<0.05, \*\*p<0.01, \*\*\*p<0.001. For nominal or ordinal predictors, the reference category's parameter is set to 0, because it is redundant. Example of reading data: In South-Eastern Europe (SEE), *men*, compared to *women*, are 1.58 times more likely to have attended a lawful demonstration, all other things being equal (see column 12, line 2 in this table).

<sup>a</sup>SEE here includes: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, FYR Macedonia and Kosovo.

<sup>b</sup>WE here includes: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Malta, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

<sup>c</sup>CEE here includes: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovak Republic.

<sup>d</sup>FSU here includes: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine.

*Data source:* EVS 2008 for all SEE countries and WVS 2010-2014 for Romania (2012) and Slovenia (2011).

## APPENDIX II

### *The measures*

Variable/Index	Measures and methods of recoding/building variables/indices	
	European Values Survey, wave 4, 2008	World Values Survey, wave 6, 2010-2014
Gender	1=Male, 0=female	1=Male, 0=female
Age	Recoded into 3 intervals categories 1="18-29", 2="30-49", 3="50+"	Recoded into 3 intervals categories 1="18-29", 2="30-49", 3="50+"
Level of education	Highest level of education attained by respondent. Missing values replaced with mean.	Highest level of education attained by respondent. Missing values replaced with mean.
Household income	Scale ranging from 1 to 12	Scale ranging from 1 to 10.
Size of locality	Scale ranging from 1 to 8, i.e. 1='under 2,000'... 8=500,000 and more	Scale ranging from 1 to 8, i.e. 1=under 2,000... 8=500,000 and more
Student	Dummy variable (recoded from v337): 1=yes, 0=no	Dummy variable (recoded from v229): 1=yes, 0=no
Employed	Dummy variable (recoded from v337): 1=yes, 0=no	Dummy variable (recoded from v229): 1=yes, 0=no
Trade unionist	Recoded variable (v13) 1=yes, 0=no	Recoded variable (v28) 1=yes, 0=no
Political party member	Recoded variable (v14) 1=yes, 0=no	Recoded variable (v29) 1=yes, 0=no
Civil Society Member	Recoded variable for membership in at least one CSO (v10-12, v15-20): 1=yes, 0=no	Recoded variable for membership in at least one CSO (v25-27, v30-35): 1=yes, 0=no
Frequency of church attendance	V109 scale ranging from 1 (more than once a week) to 7 (never)	V145 scale ranging from 1 (more than once a week) to 7 (never)
Political discussion	Recoded variable for engagement in political discussions with friends (v7): 1=yes, 0=no	Not asked
Scale of trust in other people	Scale ranging from 1 ='Most people would try to take advantage of me' to 10 ='Most people would try to be fair' (v63). Missing values replaced with country mean.	Scale ranging from 1 ='People would try to take advantage of you' to 10 ='People would try to be fair' (v56). Missing values replaced with country mean.
Index/Scale of Immigration tolerance	Additive index based on variables v268-v272, and v274-v275. Cronbach's Alpha= 0.861	V46 'When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to people of this country over immigrants', 1=agree, 2=neither, 3=disagree
Index of lifestyle tolerance	Additive index based on variables (v242-244) regarding the degree to which homosexuality, abortion and divorce are justifiable	Additive index based on variables (v203-205) regarding the degree to which homosexuality, abortion and divorce are justifiable
Scale of gender role traditionalism	V103 'When jobs are scarce, men have more right to a job than women', recoded into 1= disagree, 2=neither, 3= agree	V45 'When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women', recoded into 1=disagree, 2=neither, 3= agree
Index of post-materialism	1 =Materialist, 2= Mixed, 3 = Post-materialist	1 =Materialist, 2= Mixed, 3 = Post-materialist
Cosmopolitan sense of belonging	The feeling of belonging to the world (v253), 1=yes, 0=no	'I see myself as a world citizen' (v212), 1=yes, 0=no
Index of inclusive views on nationality	Additive index based on scores from variables v276, v278, v279, v280	Not asked
Scale of opposition to social change	V200, 1='The entire way our society is organized must be radically changed by revolutionary action' 2='our society must be gradually	Not asked

Variable/Index	Measures and methods of recoding/building variables/indices	
	European Values Survey, wave 4, 2008	World Values Survey, wave 6, 2010-2014
	changed by reforms' 3='our present society must be valiantly defended against all changes	
Ideological self-positioning on the Left-Right scale	Recoded variable (v193), 1=Left, 2=Right, 3=Center	Recoded variable (v95), 1=Left, 2=Right, 3=Center
Index of trust in political institutions	Additive index measuring trust in national government , parties and parliament (v211, v221, v222 reverse coded)	Additive index measuring trust in national government , parties and parliament (v115, v116, v117 reverse coded)
Index of political socialization within family	Additive index based on reversed scores from variables v361, v362, v365,v366	Not asked
Scale of political interest	V186 recoded: How interested are you in politics? 1-not at all, 2- not very interested, 3-somewhat interested, 4-very interested	V84 recoded: How interested are you in politics? 1-not at all, 2- not very interested, 3-somewhat interested, 4-very interested
Index of democratic support	Additive index based on v225, v226, v227, and v228 (scores reversed)	Additive index based on v127, v128, v129, and v130 (scores reversed)